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I. INTRODUCTION
When the Ohio legislature adopted the Uniform Commercial Code
in 1961, it incorporated the uniform rule governing priority of security
interests in fixtures.1 The Ohio provision was criticized immediately by
writers and attorneys representing real estate interests who claimed that
the statute was inconsistent with the fixture law of the state and harmful
to the legitimate interests of real estate mortgagees and purchasers. Pri-
marily as a result of the efforts of the Ohio Savings and Loan League,
Professor of Law, University of Toledo.
'Section 9-313 of UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE [hereinafter cited as the U.C.C.] was
revised in 1956 and remained unchanged in the 1962 Official Text. Ohio adopted the U.C.C.
in 1961, effective July 1, 1962. The 1962 text of § 9-313 which the Ohio legislature adopted
without change reads as follows:
Section 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures
(1) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a strdcture in
the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work and the like and no
security interest in them exists under this Article unless the structure remains personal
property under applicable law. The law of this state other than this Act determines
whether and when other goods become fixtures. This Act does not prevent creation
of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real
estate.
(2) A security interest which attaches to goods before they become fixtures takes
priority as to the goods over the claims of all persons who have an interest in the
real estate except as stated in subsection (4).
(3) A security interest which attaches to goods after they become fixtures is valid
against all persons subsequently acquiring interests in the real estate except as stated
in subsection (4) but is invalid against any person with an interest in the real estate
at the time the security interest attaches to the goods who has not in writing consented
to the security interest or disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures.
(4) The security interests described in subsections (2) and (3) do not take priority
over
(a) a subsequent purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate; or
(b) a creditor with a lien on the.real estate subsequently obtained by judicial
proceedings; or
(c) a creditor with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the
extent that he makes subsequent advances
if the subsequent purchase is made, the lien by judicial proceedings is obtained, or
the subsequent advance under the prior encumbrance is made or contracted for with-
out knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected. A purchaser of the
real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an encumbrancer purchasing at his own
foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this section.
(5) When under subsections (2) or (3) and (4) a secured party has priority over
the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on default, sub-
ject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral from the real estate but he
must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor
and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but
not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods
removed or by any necessity for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement
may refuse permission to remove until the secured party gives adequate security
for the performance of this obligation.
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amendatory legislation was introduced in the legislature and passed in
1963; the revised Ohio version of U.C.C. § 9-313 which was adopted
reversed the basic priority provisions of the uniform law.2
Ohio was not the only jurisdiction to reject the uniform text of §
9-313. The California legislature omitted the section, preferring to leave
problems of priorities to existing real estate law. Iowa, by specific legisla-
tive enactment, rendered Article 9 inapplicable to priority conflicts concern-
ing fixtures in situations in which one of the claimants is the holder of
an interest in real estate.' The Florida legislature changed its mind about
the desirability of the uniform provision and adopted a statute identical
to the 1963 Ohio law.4 Idaho reversed the uniform section's priority as
it affected a person with an interest in the real estate when the goods
become fixtures, but retained the U.C.C. priority in regard to subsequent
real estate interests.' The real and apparent difficulties resulting from §
9-313 have been commented upon by numerous writers" and have resulted
2 OHIO REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.32 (Page Supp. 1972).
Priority of security interests in fixtures.
(A) The rules of this section do not apply to goods incorporated into a structure
in the manner of lumber, bricks, tile, cement, glass, metal work, and the like and no
security interest in them exists under sections 1309.01 to 1309.50, inclusive, of
the Revised Code unless the structure remains personal property under applicable law.
The law of this state other than Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304., 1305., 1306.,
1307., 1308., and 1309. of the Revised Code, determines whether and when other
goods become fixtures. Chapters 1301., 1302., 1303., 1304., 1305., 1306., 1307.,
1308., and 1309. of the Revised Code do not prevent creation of an encumbrance
upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate.
(B) A security interest in goods which are or become fixtures is invalid against
any person with an interest in the real estate at the time the security interest in the
goods is perfected or at the time the goods are affixed to the real estate, whichever
occurs later, who has not in writing consented to the security interest or disclaimed
an interest in the goods as fixtures.
A security interest in goods which are or become fixtures takes priority as to the
goods over the claims of all persons acquiring interests in the real estate subsequent
to the perfection of such security interest or the affixing of the goods to the real es-
tate, whichever occurs later.
(C) When under division (B) of this section a secured party has priority over
the claims of all persons who have interests in the real estate, he may, on default,
subject to the provisions of sections 1309.44 to 1309.50, inclusive, of the Revised
Code, remove his collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse any encum-
brancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise
agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in
value of the real estate caused by the absence of the goods removed or by any neces-
sity for replacing them. A person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission
to remove until the secured parry gives adequate security for the performance of this
obligation. The secured party shall give reasonable notification of his intention
to remove the collateral to all persons entitled to reimbursement.
a IOWA CODE § 554.9313 (1967).
4 FLA. STAT. ANN. § 679.9-313(2), (3) (1972 Supp.).
5 IDAHO CODE § 28-9-313(2) (1967):
6See, e.g., 2 G. GILMORE, SECURITY INTERESTS IN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 30.1-30.6
(1965) [hereinafter cited as G. GILMORE); Coogan, Fixtures - Uniformity in Words or Fact?,
113 U. PA. L REv. 1186 (1965); Coogan, Security Interests in Fixtures Under the Uniform
Commercial Code, 75 HARv. L. REV. 1319 (1962); Kripke, Fixtures Under the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, 64 COLUM. L. REv. 44 (1964) [hereinafter cited as Kripkej.
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in efforts to redraft the section to take account of certain criticisms.' In
1971, proposals for change were included in the Final Report of the Ar-
ticle 9 Review Committee,8 and these recommendations became part of
the 1972 Official Text of the Uniform Commercial Code.9
7The Review Committee for Article 9 of the U.C.C. released preliminary drafts of revised
versions of § 9-313 in 1968 and 1970.
8 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW COM-
MITEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, FINAL REPORT (April 25,
1971).
9U.C.C. § 9-313 (1972 Official Text).
Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures
(1) In this section and in the provisions of Part 4 of this Article referring to fix-
ture filing, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) goods are "fixtures" when they become so related to particular real estate
that an interest in them arises under real estate law.
(b) a "fixture filing" is the filing in the office where a mortgage on the real
estate would be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering goods which are
or are to become fixtures and conforming to the requirements of subsection (5)
of Section 9-402.
(c) a mortgage is a "construction mortgage" to the extent that it secures an
obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on land including the
acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so indicates.
(2) A security interest under this Article may be created in goods which are fixtures
or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no security interest exists under
this Article in ordinary building materials incorporated into an improvement on land.
(3) This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures pursuant
to real estate law.
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflicting interest
of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the interest of the
encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fixtures, the security interest
is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods become fixtures or within ten days
thereafter, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real estate or is in posses-
sion of the real estate; or
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the interest of the
encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has priority over any con-
flicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encumbrancer or owner, and the debtor
has an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(c) the fixtures are readily removable factory or office machines or readily re-
movable replacements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods, and before
the goods become fixtures the security interest is perfected by any method permitted
by this Article; or
(d) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by legal or
equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by any method per-
mitted by this Article.
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority over the
conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the security interest
or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the encumbrancer or
owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the security interest continues
for a reasonable time.
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise subject to sub-
sections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate to a construction mort-
gage recorded before the goods become fixtures if the goods become fixtures before the
completion of the construction. To the extent that it is given to refinance a con-
struction mortgage, a mortgage has this priority to the same extent as the construction
mortgage.
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The 1972 Official Text amounts to a significant and widespread amend-
ment of Article 9 generally, quite apart from its effect upon § 9-313. As
such it deserves careful consideration by state legislatures.1 This article
is concerned with Ohio's response to the new version of U.C.C. § 9-313.
An ideal opportunity has presented itself for the Ohio legislature to con-
sider the wisdom of its action in 1963 when it adopted the then unique
version of the fixture security interest priority rule.1 It is the author's
opinion that Ohio should adopt the 1972 version of § 9-313 with modi-
fications to be described which will not interfere with the goal of uniform-
ity sought by the sponsors of the uniform act.
II. ANALYSIS OF THE 1962 UNIFORM FIXTURE PRioaRTy PRoVIsIoN
A. Criticisms of § 9-313
In order to determine the desirability of legislative adopton of the
1972 uniform fixture priority provision, it is useful to consider the nature
of the criticisms which were leveled against Ohio's adoption of the earlier
uniform act, the extent to which these criticisms are reflected in Ohio's pres-
ent statute, and the validity of the arguments which resulted in Ohio's
rejection of the uniform provision. One commentator, in an article which
was prepared before Ohio's adoption of its 1963 amendment but published
thereafter, made the following criticisms of the original Ohio statute:
The concept of "detachable fixture" introduced by § 9-313 is incompatible
with Ohio common law which defines a fixture as realty which is not sub-
ject to removal by a creditor; section 9-313 (2) endows an Article 9 secured
creditor with a super-priority over existing real estate interests; and the fix-
ture security interest recognized by § 9-313 constitutes a secret lien-in
some situations no public filing is required; in others the filing is not de-
(7) In cases not within the preceding subsections, a security interest in fixtures is
subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the related real
estate who is not the debtor.
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbrancers of the
real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of Part 5, remove his collateral
from the real estate but he must reimburse any encumbrancer or owner of the real
estate who is not the debtor and who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair
of any physical injury, but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused
by the absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A person
entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the secured party
gives adequate security for the performance of this obligation.
30The 1972 amendments have already been adopted in Illinois, effective July 1, 1973,
and in Arkansas and North Dakota, effective January 1, 1974.
11 One author has described the Ohio legislature's action in the following terms: 'Thus,
in rejecting Section 9-313, Ohio has not really affirmed a long-standing policy or line of
decisions; it would appear, rather, that it has chosen a new, uncharted road." Shanker, An
Integrated Financing System for Purchase Money Collateral: A Proposed Solution to the Fixture
Problem under Section 9-313 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 73 YALE LJ. 788, 789 (1964)
[hereinafter cited as Shanker).
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signed to come to the attention of a holder of a conflicting real estate in-
terest.'2
Another commentator has suggested that the removal provisions of
§ 9-313(5) may have been the most objectionable feature of the 1962 ver-
sion. When the fixture subject to the security interest is a vital replace-
ment item such as an elevator or furnace, removal of the fixture upon
the debtor's default may render a building completely or nearly useless.'"
A related, but somewhat different, criticism was advanced by the Ohio Sav-
ings and Loan League. The replacement of items originally subject to
the real estate mortgage by new fixtures subject to Article 9 security in-
terests might result in diminishing substantially the value of the mort-
gagee's security. 4 Other League objections related to the filing of financ-
ing statements under the name of non-owners of the real estate (e.g.,
tenants) and concern that Ohio cases seemed to indicate a trend in favor
of enlarging the classification of fixtures. 15
B. The Ohio Amendment of § 9-313
In response to such criticisms, the Ohio legislature replaced the uni-
form text of § 9-313 with the provision which is now Ohio law. By
subjecting a fixture security interest to all real estate interests in existence
"at the time the security interest in the goods is perfected or 'at the time
the goods are affixed to the real estate, whichever occurs later,"'0 the legis-
lature met many of the objections which were raised against the uniform
provision. No longer may the unperfected secured party whose security
interest has attached to goods before they become fixtures have priority
over existing real estate interests. Indeed, absent a written disclaimer by
the possessor of the real estate interest, there is no way for the fixture
lender to obtain a priority over existing real estate interests. All that
is left to the fixture lender is the possibility of obtaining a priority over
real estate interests which arise after perfection of the fixture security in-
terest or the affixing of the goods to the real estate, whichever occurs later.
In order to perfect his security interest and thus obtain this priority over
subsequent real estate interests, the fixture lender must file a financing state-
12Hollander, Imperfections in Perfection of Ohio Fixture Liens, 14 WEsr. RES. L. REv.
683 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Hollander].
13 Shanker, supra note 11, at 806.
14 Letter from William W. Taft to Jerome Parker, the author's research assistant, April
30, 1973.
15 Id. See also Burns, Some Specific Problems Raised by Article 9 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code in Ohio, 14 WEsT. RES. L. REv. 56 (1962).
16OHo REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.32(B) (Page Supp. 1972). The only exception occurs
when the possessor of the real estate interest disclaims in writing an interest in the goods
as fixtures.
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ment."' Put simply, the legislation reversed the priority scheme of the
uniform act.
In addition the 1963 legislature adopted several amendments to filing
procedures in Ohio, which were designed to insure that the fixture interest
would come to the attention of searchers of the real estate records. "When
the financing statement covers . . . goods which are or are to become
fixtures, the statement must also contain a description of the real estate
concerned and the name of the record owner or record lessee thereof."'8
A financing statement covering fixtures must "contain a reference to the
recorder's file number of the mortgage upon real estate or to the volume
and page of the mortgage record in which such mortgage is recorded,"' 9
and the financing statement must be indexed "in the real estate mortgage
records by the filing officer according to the name of the owner or lessee
given in the [financing3 statement."'  Thus all elements of the "super-
priority" of the fixture security interest and any suggested secrecy of such
an interest have been eliminated.
To provide protection even for a holder of a subsequent real estate
interest which is subordinate to the fixture security interest, the revised
Ohio provision requires that "[t]he secured party shall give reasonable
notification of his intention to remove the collateral to all persons entitled
to reimbursement."'2' Thus even if the fixture lender has a priority over
the real estate interest holder, notice must be given to the latter in order to
permit him to protect his interests by contesting the right of the fixture
lender to remove or by paying off the fixture lender.
The fixturd financer can no longer impinge upon the security of an
earlier real estate interest holder by removing a vital fixture, since it is
impossible for the fixture financer to obtain an interest superior to that
of the prior mortgagee. Nor will the security of a prior mortgagee be
reduced as the result of replacement of items originally subject to the real
estate mortgage by new fixtures which add no new value to the real estate.
The scheme established by the revised Ohio statute constitutes a virtually
complete victory for real estate interests and places the fixture lender in
an untenable position unless his debtor is the sole party interested in the
realty to which the goods in question are related. 2
17 OHIo Rnv. CODE ANN. § 1309.21 (Page Supp. 1972). Under § 1309.21 (a) (4) even
a purchase money security interest in consumer goods is subject to the filing requirement
if the chattel is a fixture.
I8 OHro REv. CODE: ANN. § 1309.39(A) (Page Supp. 1972) (emphasis in text added).
19 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.40(B) (2) (Page Supp. 1972).
2 0 Owo REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.40(D) (Page Supp. 1972).
2 1 OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.32 (C) (Page Supp. 1972).
22 Following the action by the Ohio legislature in revising the fixture priority provision,
Mr. Hollander wrote that "the real estate lien has been restored to its precode position, and
the doctrine of the Holland Furance case has been reestablished." Hollander, supra note
12, at 698. His reference is to Holland Fur ce Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135
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Left unresolved by the revised Ohio provision, however, is the problem
of the "detachable fixture." In order to obtain a priority over a subsequent
real estate interest, the fixture lender must know whether the goods which
are subject to his security interests are or may become fixtures.28  The
dearth of Ohio cases since 196324 suggests that the amended Ohio statute
has relegated that question to one of little importance in view of the strong
position of real estate interest holders.25  This problem of defining a fix-
ture in connection with the fixture priority provision of the Code, however,
is one which cannot be ignored forever. This is particularly true if the
Ohio legislature is to give consideration to adopting the 1972 uniform pro-
vision, which in some instances would recognize the superior interest of
fixture financers over holders of existing real estate interests.
C. The Functioning of the U.C.C. and the Ohio Fixture Rule
The criticisms which led the Ohio legislature to reject the uniform
version of § 9-313 fall into three categories. The first of these relates
to the basic question of the appropriateness of the resolution of the priority
issue between the fixture lender and the holder of a real estate interest.
The second amounts to a charge that § 9-313 represents a backward step
Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273 (1939). This is an overly broad reading of Holland Furnace.
As has been pointed out by Professor Shanker, the decision in that case was limited expressly
to the resolution of the question of the rights of a subsequent purchaser for value, without
notice of the interest of the fixture lender. The court treats the fact that the subsequent
purchaser happened also to be a prior mortgagee as irrelevant. Professor Shanker is correct
when he states that "[t]he few Ohio cases specifically dealing with the conflict between the
prior land interest and the fixture security interest usually followed Section 9-313's approach
favoring the fixture security interest, at least where removal of the fixture could be accomplished
without material injury to the building." Shanker, supra note 11, at 789.
2 Such a determination is necessary in order to know what filing requirements must be
met. The question, whether or not goods which will be used in connection with realty will
become fixtures under Ohio law, will also be important to a seller of goods who can obtain
a priority over existing realty interests only if the goods are determined not to be fixtures.
24 The only Ohio case since the 1963 amendment dealing with priorities between a mortgagee
and a fixture lender is Exchange Leasing Corp. v. Aegen, 7 Ohio App. 2d 11, 218 N.E.2d
633 (1966). In that case the Cuyahoga County Court of Appeals held that carpeting which
had been cut to room size and attached to unfinished floors in an apartment building had
lost its identity as personalty and had become a part of the realty. A purchase/lease back
arrangement entered into between the owner of the building and the plaintiff (who was
attempting to repossess the carpeting upon the owner's default) was held to be ineffective
in so far as it affected the rights of the prior mortgagee. Although the facts of the case
are somewhat ambiguous, this lease arrangement was apparently one "intended as security"
under U.C.C. § 9-102 and U.C.C. § 1-201 (37). Apparently no financing statement was
ever filed by the plaintiff. The opinion makes no reference to the Uniform Commercial
Code, but holds that the lease arrangement was ineffective to vest any interest in the plaintiff-
fixture lender superior to that of the mortgagee. The case is easily resolvable under Ohio
Rev. Code § 1309.32, since the plaintiff's security interest would be invalid against a mortgagee
who held an interesrin the real estate at the time the lease arrangement was executed.
25The chief area of potential conflict, and hence the primary area of litigation, involves
an existing real estate interest holder and the seller of goods who wishes to obtain a purchase
money security interest which will prevail even when the goods become fixtures. This is
impossible under Ohio law, absent the consent of the real estate interest holder. OHIo REV.
CODE ANN. § 1309.32 (Page Supp. 1972).
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in the direction of the creation of secret liens. Finally it has been sug-
gested that § 9-313 makes an assumption about fixtures which is in basic
conflict with Ohio common law. Ohio law, according to this last argument,
fails to recognize the concept of "removable fixture" which the Code as-
sumes in § 9-313(5).
1. Priority between Fixture Lender and Holder of Real Estate Interest
The 1962 version of § 9-313 creates a priority on behalf of the fix-
ture lender over all real estate interests in existence at the time of the
attachment of the security interest. All that is required is that the fixture
security interest attach to the goods before they become fixtures.26  No
perfection of any kind is required in order to sustain this priority. The
practical effect of this provision is to advantage a purchase money secured
creditor who extends credit on the sale of a chattel which will become
a fixture. In the rare case of a lender who accepts an existing fixture
as collateral, the lender's security interest "is invalid against any person
with an interest in the real estate at the time the security interest attaches
to the goods"27 unless the real estate interest holder disclaims his interest
in writing.
The rationale behind the preferred status of the purchase money lender
over the existing real estate interest holder is that the former's extension
of credit makes the purchase of a new asset by the debtor possible. The
assumption is that the effect of the transaction is to increase the value of
the realty, and thus the value of the mortgagee's security.28 The effect
of the Code's priority scheme is to permit an owner of realty to turn to
sources other than his mortgagee for credit necessary to support the reno-
vation and upkeep of his property through the purchase of new fixtures;
likewise, plant expansion and modernization are facilitated.'
26 The security interest attaches when (1) the parties agree that it attach, (2) value is
given, and (3) the debtor obtains rights in the collateral. U.C.C. § 9-204 (1962 Official
Text).
2T U.C.C. § 9-313(3) (1962 Official Text).
28The mortgagee of course will have a secondary interest in the fixture under the terms
of mortgage. As the purchase money lender's interest is satisfied by the debtor's payments,
the mortgagee acquires additional primary security. U.C.C. § 9-313(1) provides that "[t3his
act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures or real estate pursuant to
the law applicable to real estate."
29 Mr. Hollander has suggested that the purchase money lender's priority is not necessary
to allow plant expansion in Ohio, "since detachable machinery is likely to be personalty
in Ohio." Hollander, supra note 12, at 687. He relies upon two cases, Zangerle v. Republic
Steel Corp., 144 Ohio St. 529, 60 N.E.2d 170 (1945) and Standard Oil Co. v. Zangerle,
141 Ohio St. 505, 49 N.E.2d 406 (1943). Both of these cases involved classification of
property for the purpose of state taxation, and therefore do not provide much information
as to how a court will classify detachable machinery in a different context. Indeed, the court
in Republic made it clear that its decision that certain machinery did not constitute improve-
ments on land for the purpose of taxation was limited to its context. The Standard Oil
case concerns the question of the application of the defense of res judicata to a prior determina-
tion of the classification of property for the purpose of taxation. For further discussion of
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To the extent that the fixture is a new and additional asset to the
structure, the mortgagee hardly has a basis for complaint. In making
his original credit decision, the mortgagee did not rely upon fixtures not
then in existence. Thus, even his secondary interest in the fixture consti-
tutes a windfall in the form of additional security; for him to suggest
that he is entitled to priority over the purchase money lender as to such
new asset is unreasonable and amounts to a claim that he, the mortgagee,
became the sole source of credit for the owner in connection with improve-
ment of the property by addition of fixtures. The point is so obvious
that even critics of § 9-313 have not advanced any argument to the con-
trary respecting pure additions to the property in the form of fixtures.
A somewhat different issue arises, however, when the owner of property
replaces an existing fixture with a new one. This may result in removal
of collateral as to which the mortgagee has a primary interest and its
replacement by a fixture in which a purchase money lender obtains a prior-
ity under § 9-313. At least a partial answer to this question is provided
by common sense. Few home owners, landlords, or factory owners will
replace valuable fixtures simply for the purpose of reducing the security
of their mortgagees. A more realistic assumption is that fixtures will be
replaced by an owner only when such replacement is necessary and will
benefit the owner economically. Thus what the mortgagee is likely to
be deprived of in many cases will be worn out or outmoded fixtures; in
place of these he will obtain a secondary interest in new and more valuable
fixtures.
Other arguments raised against the priority of the purchase money se-
cured party over the prior mortgagee relate to the damage which may
result to the real estate (and thus to the mortgagee's security) as a result
of removal of collateral under U.C.C. § 9-313(5). Although the secured
creditor must reimburse the real estate interest holder for physical injury
to the property resulting from the removal, he is not required to pay for
diminution in value of the real property resulting from the absence of
the goods or the need to replace them. It has been argued that the mort-
gagee has a valid complaint if § 9-313 permits the removal of a fixture
which is essential to the functioning of the structure to which it is affixed.
Assuming that such a result may be possible under § 9-313, the argument
ignores the real world in which the mortgagee and secured creditor operate.
The removal of an essential fixture as a result of the debtor's default nor-
mally will be of little financial advantage to the secured creditor and will
be positively harmful to the mortgagee; under these circumstances a differ-
ent solution is likely to be found by the parties.
An elevator, furnace, or air-conditioning system which is removed from
the irrelevancy of tax case precedents to the questions presented by § 9-313, see text ac-
companying footnotes 48 to 54 infra.
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the structure to which it has been affixed is unlikely to have sufficient resale
value to cause the secured creditor to actively seek removal. The value
of the creditor's right to remove is more likely to consist of the threat
of removal. If the debtor is in default on payments to his mortgagee
as well as to his secured creditor, both of these parties will prefer to avail
themselves of foreclosure provisions. Another possibility is that the mort-
gagee will find it financially advantageous to pay off the secured creditor
and thus obtain a priority as to the fixture ° Yet another device available
to a mortgagee who is troubled about the possibility of diminution of
his security is the insertion of a covenant or a condition in the mortgage
itself, prohibiting the removal of any fixture. Of course, the result of
such a condition may be to bring about deterioration of the mortgagee's
security as the property becomes worn out or outmoded.
All of what has been said concerning this problem, however, assumes
that removal of an essential fixture will be permitted automatically under
§ 9-313. It has been suggested that the principle of § 1-103 incorporating
supplementary principles of law and equity into the Code, might be avail-
able to a real estate mortgagee as to whom removal of the fixture might
constitute waste." Because removal is not the only remedy available to
the secured creditor,32 a court could construe the removal provision of
§ 9-313 to permit removal only when it would not substantially destroy
the economic value of the realty affected. This position is consistent with
courts' longstanding abhorrence of economic waste and their efforts to
avoid decisions which would encourage or permit such waste.
There is one situation, however, involving the construction mortgage,
in which the legitimate concerns of the real estate mortgagee were over-
looked by the 1962 text of § 9-313. A construction mortgagee, generally,
is one who makes periodic advances on the basis of a previous commitment
to the owner/debtor for the construction of a building or other improve-
ment on land. Construction may well include the attachment of fixtures.
In this case, the possibility of double financing by the owner-debtor is
apparent, and a construction mortgagee who has legitimate expectations
that the security for his first mortgage will include fixtures may be disap-
pointed to learn that purchase money lenders have obtained a priority un-
der § 9 -3 13.a As one who is putting up "new money" for the construc-
3OThe present Ohio version of § 9-313 provides that "ftjhe secured party shall give
reasonable notification of his intention to remove the collateral to all persons entitled to
reimbursement." Orno REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.32(C) (Page Supp. 1972). This minor
amendment, which in all probability reflects current business practices on the part of secured
creditors who appreciate being paid off by mortgagees, is a desirable one.
a Shanker, supra note 11, at 806. See also Gilmore, supra note 6, at 836.
32 U.C.C. § 9-501 (1) and (4) (1962 and 1972 Official Text). The secured party's remedies
include judgment and foreclosure proceedings.
33 It is possible for the construction mortgagee to protect himself from this eventuality
by the cumbersome process of searching recording fles before each advance.
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tion of an improvement, including purchase and installation of fixtures,
the mortgagee is entitled to the same kind of consideration offered a pur-
chase money lender in § 9-313 (2).
It has been suggested that a construction mortgagee may be protected
by virtue of § 9-313(4) (c), in that he is a prior creditor making a sub-
sequent advance contracted for before perfection of the competing fixture
security interest.34 The meaning of § 9-313 (4) (c) is ambiguous, however,
and it can be read to protect the construction mortgagee only if he "makes
his commitment or his advance (a) after the security interest has attached
and (b) after the affixation of the fixture and (c) before real estate notifica-
tion." The interest of the construction mortgagee is to obtain a priority
as to fixtures which he assumed were purchased with the money he loaned
the owner. There is no reason to subject him to the burden of making
a search for competing security interests prior to each advance. Once
he records his mortgage, he should have priority as to fixtures which are
installed during the course of construction, and that priority should take
the form of something more than the chink in the armor provided by a
liberal reading of § 9-313(4).
Discussion thus far has centered upon only one facet of the priority
policy of § 9-313-the relative positions of the secured creditor and the
holder of an existing real estate interest. The 1962 version of the U.C.C.
relegates the secured creditor to a position inferior to that of "a subsequent
purchaser for value of any interest in the real estate"38 or of "a creditor
with a prior encumbrance of record on the real estate to the extent that
he makes subsequent advances.13 7 The subsequent purchase must be made
and the subsequent advance must be made or contracted for "without
knowledge of the security interest and before it is perfected."38 A real
estate mortgagee will be a purchaser for the purpose of this provision."
The purpose of this statutory priority is to protect the subsequent purchaser
who extends credit on the basis of the collateral which he sees, including
fixtures. That is to say, unless the purchaser knows40 of the earlier security
interest, or unless perfection (public filing) of the competing interest has
given him constructive knowledge, the purchaser's rights will be superior.
If the word "subsequent" is taken to relate to affixation of the chattel rather
than to attachment of the creditor's security interest,41 the secured creditor
84 Gilmore, supra note 6, at 830-32.
85Kripke, supra note 6, at 73.
86 U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (a) (1962 Official Text).
m UCC. § 9-313(4)(c) (1962 Official Text).
38 ld.
89 U.C.C. § 1-201(32) (1962 Official Text).
40 "A person 'knows' or has 'knowledge' of a fact when he has actual knowledge of it."
U.C.C. § 1-201(25) (1962 Official Text).
4 1 See 2 G. GILMORE, supra note 6, at 824-28; J. WHim & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM
COMAMRCIAL CODE § 25-10 at 932-33 (1972) [hereinafter cited as J. WHrrB & R. SUMMERSJ.
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will prevail unless the real estate interest arises after affixation and before
perfection. This is entirely consistent with the idea that the real estate
interest holder could not have considered the fixture in making his credit
decision unless the fixture existed (i.e., was affixed) prior to the acquisition
of the real estate interest. If the real estate interest arose subsequent to
perfection, however, the mortgagee had constructive knowledge of the se-
cured creditor's interest and thus could and should have made his credit
decision accordingly.
In amending the uniform language of § 9-313, the Ohio legislature
made a radical change in regard to the priority position of the subsequent
real estate interest holder. The amended statute provides that the secured
creditor will prevail over "all persons acquiring interest in the real estate
subsequent to the perfection of such security interest or the affixing of the
goods to the real estate, whichever occurs later. ' '42 The converse implica-
tion is that the secured creditor will be inferior to one who acquires his
interest in the realty before perfection or affixation, whichever occurs later.
The effect of the operation of the Ohio rule, in contrast with that of the
uniform provision, can be seen in the following examples.
sale of chattel
and attachment of
security interest affixation perfection
(a) (b) (c)
Under § 9-313 (4) of the 1962 Code, the purchaser/mortgagee will prevail
only if his interest was acquired between points (b) and (c) . . .after
affixation and before perfection of the secured creditor's interest. Under
the Ohio statute, the purchaser/mortgagee will prevail if he acquired his
interest anytime before point (c). Thus, even if the real state interest
was acquired before affixation, which means that the fixture was not in
existence for the purpose of the purchaser's decision to buy or to lend,
the real estate interest holder will prevail.
An even less desirable result obtains in the following situation.
sale of chattel
and attachment of
security interest perfection affixation
(a) (b) (c)
Under the uniform provision, the purchaser/mortgagee cannot prevail re-
gardless of the point in time his interest arises, since to prevail his interest
must arise after affixation and before perfection. On the other hand, under
Ohio law, the real estate interest will prevail if it arises anytime before
point (c). In addition to giving the real estate interest purchaser a priority
42 OHmo REv. CODE ANN. § 1309.32(B) (Page Supp. 1972).
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as to a fixture not in existence at the time of the purchase, the Ohio provi-
sion permits him to ignore a public filing of the secured creditor's interest.
The holder of the real estate interest will prevail unless he was hapless
enough to acquire his interest after perfection of the secured creditor's in-
terest and after affixation of the goods to the realty.
Apart from legitimate concern about the position of a construction
mortgagee under the unifor mprovision, the policy judgment made by
the drafters of the 1962 text of § 9-313 is sound. Whatever the difficulties
of § 9-313 may be, the basic priority decision incorporated into the uni-
form text is preferable to the Ohio version. The purchase money secured
creditor who adds to the value of the realty by extending credit ought to be
preferred over the holder of a real estate interest who is attempting to as-
sert a priority over a fixture which was not in existence at the time of the
latter's credit decision. Economic reality dictates that this priority policy
will seldom injure the real estate interest holder even when the fixtures
are replacements rather than pure additions to the realty. The fact that
removal of an essential fixture may be inappropriate when the effect of re-
moval would be to substantially destroy the economic value of the realty
does not justify the radical surgery which the Ohio legislature has per-
formed on § 9-313. A priority rule which permits the real estate interest
holder to ignore a public filing of notice of a creditor's security interest in
the fixture and to obtain priority as to a fixture which was not in existence
at the time the real estate interest was acquired is unsupportable in terms
of logic or policy.
2. Secret Liens
Even assuming the appropriateness of the resolution of basic priority
policies of the uniform act, critics have charged that § 9-313 permits secret
liens. Thus, the argument goes, not only is the holder of a real estate
interest in an inferior position vis-A-vis the secured creditor, he may not
even be aware of this inferiority. It is certainly true that § 9-313(2)
establishes a priority on behalf of some secured creditors absent perfection.
As has been pointed out above, the requirement of this provision that
the security interest attach to the goods before they become fixtures limits
the effect of the rule for practical purposes to purchase money secured
creditors. The justification suggested has been "the traditional preferred
status of a purchase money secured creditor. ' 48 Because the priority which
a secured creditor obtains under § 9-313(2) relates only to a non-subse-
quent real estate interest, the provision assumes a fixture which was not
considered by the real estate interest holder at the time he acquired his
43 J. WHIT & R. SUMMRS, supra note 41, at 927. For a detailed examination of the
history and scope of the preference given the purchase money creditor, see Gilmore, The Pur-
chase Money Priority, 76 HARV. L. REV. 1333 (1963) [hereinafter cited as Gilmore).
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interest. When the fixture in question amounts to a replacement of an
older one, however, it is possible that the security of a mortgagee may
be adversely affected without his knowledge, and it is conceivable that a
mortgagee may be lulled into a sense of false security by the addition
of new fixtures as to which there is no public recording of an outstanding
security interest. Nonetheless, it is doubtful that these theoretical prob-
lems were of sufficiently practical import to justify the adoption of the
revised Ohio statute. Moreover, in response to such criticism the element
of secrecy has been virtually eliminated from the 1972 uniform text.
3. The Concept of Fixtures under Ohio Law
Finally there remains the question of the compatibility of the concept
of fixture envisioned by the drafters of § 9-313 and the definition (or
lack of definition) of fixture by the courts of Ohio. Section 9-313 assumes
a tripartite classification of property as (1) chattel, (2) realty, and (3)
detachable or removable fixture. It is only this third class which is subject
to the rule of § 9-313. Judicial decisions in Ohio, on. the other hand,
have led some to include this state in the minority of jurisdictions which
recognize only two basic classifications of property-real and personal-
and regard fixtures as the former. Since the definition of fixture for the
purpose of § 9-313 is left to state law other than the U.C.C., it is essential
to understand the position of the Ohio courts on this question.
The starting point for analysis of Ohio fixture law is Teaff v. Hewitt.44
In particular, one statement in Judge Bartley's opinion in that case has
been regarded as creating the basis for an irreconcilable conflict between
Ohio's fixture concept and the definitional assumption contained in § 9-
313.
A removable fixture as a term of general application, is a solecism-a
contradiction in words. There does not appear to be any necessity or pro-
priety in classifying movable articles, which may be for temporary pur-
poses somewhat attached to the land, under any general denomination dis-
tinguishing them from other chattel property.45
The court continues, making an effort to develop a universal definition
of a fixture, as follows: "A fixture is an article which was a chattel, but
which by being physically annexed or affixed to the realty, became acces-
sory to it and part and parcel of it."'46  The opinion specifically rejects
any division of fixtures into classifications of removable and irremovable,
47
thus permitting the conclusion by some that Ohio has no "removable fix-
ture" law, which is essential for the functioning of § 9-313.
44 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853).
45Id. at 524.
461d. at 527.
47 1d. at 525.
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A more useful approach to the confusing question raised by this criti-
cism involves a determination of the circumstances in which Ohio courts
have permitted a chattel in some way closely related to realty to be re-
moved by a creditor. It is clear that they have done so. 48  When the
court has permitted removal, it has determined the property in question
to be a chattel; when it has refused to permit removal, it has reached
the determination that the property is a fixture, and thus not removable.49
The problem before the court is not an abstract one of definition; rather
it is the resolution of conflicting interests in valuable property. The con-
flicting interests may be those of heir and personal representative, life ten-
ant and remainderman, vendor and purchaser of realty, mortgagor and
mortgagee of realty, landlord and tenant, or a seller or encumbrancer of
a chattel and a person having an interest in realty to which the chattel is
closely related in some way-the latter situation being the specific focus
of § 9-313.
A related question, sometimes discussed in terms of "fixture" law, is
that of the nature of property for the purpose of taxation. Ohio courts
have announced unchanging criteria for determining when property is a
fixture in all of these situations, ° but they have applied the criteria in
what, at first glance, appears to be a contradictory manner. The courts
themselves, however, have made it clear that the contradiction is more
apparent than real.
Regardless of how the decisions vary respecting the law governing par-
ticular classes or the relationship of the parties concerned, they seem
never to fail in recognizing that different rules apply to different classes
of parties .... An article annexed to lands may for some purposes, and
48The court in Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511 (1853), sustained removal by creditors
of a steam engine, boilers, four sets of woolen carding machines, a wool-picker, four spinning
jacks, two year reels, three bobbin machines, one reaming machine, twenty-one power looms,
and one rolling machine.
49 Vinton County Nat'l Bank v. Hunt, 14 Ohio Op. 347 (C.P. Vinton Co. 1939). Pro-
fessor Gilmore summarizes the situation in so-called "minority jurisdictions" nicely.
We suggested in our earlier discussion that in Massachusetts, and no doubt in other
states thought to adhere to the minority rule, the purchase money priority was to a
considerable degree maintained, despite the announced doctrinal position, by holding
that goods, no matter how irrevocably wrought into a structure, nevertheless remained
personal property. That is, goods which in New York were held to be "fixtures"
(and therefore removable) were held in Massachusetts to be not fixtures but "per-
sonalty" (and therefore removable). The result was the same but the semantics were
curiously different.
Gilmore, supra note 43, at 1394-95.
50 These criteria were stated in Teaff v. Hewitt, 1 Ohio St. 511, 530 (1853), as follows:
1st. Actual annexation to the realty, or something appurtenant thereto.
2d. Appropriation to the use or purpose-of that part of the realty with which it is
connected.
3d. The intention of the party making the annexation to make the article a per-
manent accession of the freehold-this intention being inferred from the nature of
the article affxed, the relation and situation of the party making the annexation, the
structure and mode of annexation, and the purpose or use for which the annexation
has been made.
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as between certain parties, be regarded as part of the realty, while as
respects other parties and objects, the same thing may be considered as
retaining its character as personalty." (Warner v. Cleveland & T. R. Co.,
22 Ohio St. 563). 51
Thus an opinion announcing that certain machinery constitutes realty or
personalty for the purpose of taxation is not particularly relevant to the
question of priorities between a chattel seller or lender on the one hand
and a holder of a competing real estate interest on the other. The Ohio
supreme court underscored this in Zangerle v. Standard Oil Co.52 a case
involving an appeal from a decision of the Board of Tax Appeals classi-
fying machinery and equipment used in connection with two oil refineries
owned by Standard. The court held the test of Teaff v. Hewitt to be con-
trolling, but recognized that the application of the test would be affected
by the fact that this was a tax evaluation case. In the course of its opinion,
the court stated:
The question here is not complicated by the conflicting interests of lien-
holders or those holding equitable rights or estates in the property. The
instant case involves the question as to what is personalty and what is real
estate in property wholly owned by a taxpayer, who for the assessment
of taxes, is entitled to the most liberal interpretation in the favor of the
facts which determine and fix the taxability of his property.5
Thus in determining what the law of Ohio is in regard to the respective
rights of a chattel seller or lender on the one hand and a mortgagee or
other holder of an interest in real property on the other, one must examine
those cases which deal with those classes of parties.
Turning first to the question of priorities between a seller of a chattel
and a person acquiring a subsequent interest in the realty, the Ohio su-
preme court has held that a subsequent purchaser of the realty who does
not have actual notice of the interest of the seller of the chattel will pre-
vail if the chattel has become related to the realty in such a way that
a reasonable subsequent purchaser would believe that it was intended to
be part of the realty.54 Absent actual notice on the part of a subsequent
mortgagee, the result is the same.55 Proper filing of the conditional sales
contract or the chattel mortgage is not sufficient to provide the element
of actual notice required.56 In the event that actual knowledge of the
seller's interest exists, however, the holder of the subsequent real estate
5 1 Vinton County Nat'l Bank v. Hunt, 14 Ohio Op. 347, 349 (C.P. Vinton Co. 1939).
52 144 Ohio St. 506, 60 N.E.2d 52 (1945).
53Id. at 519, 60 N.E.2d at 58.
5 4 Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273.
(1939).
55 XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio App.
188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937).
56 Case Mfg. Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N.E. 493 (1887).
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interest will be subject to the interest of seller of the chattel.57 The only
qualification announced is that the property must be able to be removed
without material injury to the realty or to itself.58
These cases do not announce a rule remarkably different from that
embodied in § 9-313(4), which favors the subsequent "purchaser for
value" who purchases without actual knowledge of the security interest
in the fixture. The important change which § 9-313 would have brought
about in Ohio law is the effectiveness of "perfection" in providing sufficient
constructive notice to the subsequent real estate interest holder to defeat
his priority. Modern filing requirements are designed to provide the notice
which earlier and simpler filing procedures did not accomplish. 9  Whether
the effect of actual notice under the Ohio decisions would result in classifi-
cation of the property in question as personalty rather than fixture/realty
or whether it would result in a holding that a fixture is removable by
a seller with a superior interest is not very important. Recognition of
the superior rights of the chattel lender under some circumstances is dearly
not out of line with Ohio authority.
Moving to the question of priorities between a seller of a chattel and
a prior mortgagee, the Ohio supreme court has not provided a definitive
answer. It is clear that the court did not deal with this question in Hol-
land Furnace Co. v. Trumbull6 0 In that case the subsequent real estate
purchaser who prevailed happened also to be a prior mortgagee purchasing
at a sale resulting from his earlier foreclosure on the mortgage. In reach-
ing its decision in that case the court stated: "This decision is confined
to the facts in this case, which involves the rights of a subsequent purchaser
for value, without notice."6' 1
57XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio App.
188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937).
58 Id. The requirement that removal be possible without material injury to the realty
clearly conflicts with the provision of § 9-313(5). Nonetheless, the Ohio legislature did
incorporate this provision of the U.C.C. in adopting the Ohio amendment, OHIO REV. CODE
ANN. § 1309.32 (C) (Page Supp. 1972), and in so doing overruled the state's common law.
The legislative judgment that the reimbursement requirement satisfies all legitimate needs
of the party interested in the real estate is sound.
59 In explaining why filing of a conditional sales contract did not provide notice the
Ohio Supreme Court made the following point:
There is nothing . . .which provides or requires any description of the real estate
to be affected in case the personal property sold under the conditional sales contract
is attached to or becomes a part of the real estate. Furthermore, the statute provides
that the contract or copy must be filed in the county where the purchaser resides, if
he be a resident of the state. Consequently, if he is a resident of a county other than
that in which the real estate to be affected is located, there would be no record ,what-
ever in such latter county.
Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, at 55-56, 19 N.E.2d
273, at 276 (1939). Compare Omo REV. CODE ANN. § 1309.38(A)(2) (Page 1962).
60 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 NX.2d 273 (1939).
611d. at 57, 19 N.E.2d at 277. It is interesting to note that the mortgagee in this
case would not have qualified as a "subsequent purchaser" under the 1962 version of § 9-
313, which provided that "(a) purchaser of real estate at a foreclosure sale other than an
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Lower courts in Ohio have reached the conclusion that a prior mort-
gagee will not prevail over a seller of a chattel, even when the chattel
is related to realty in such a way that the court would hold it to be a
fixture in a dispute between the seller and a subsequent mortgagee.2 In
language which sounds as though it could have been taken from an official
comment in the U.C.C., the court in East Ohio Building & Loan Co. v.
Holland Furnace Co.6 provided its rationale for supporting the priority of
a purchase money lender over a prior mortgagee.
The great weight of modern authorities upholds such a contract [con-
ditional sales contract] as against a prior secured creditor; particularly
when he advanced nothing on the faith of the annexation and the chattel
annexed may be detached without impairing the creditor's original secu-
rity."
In reaching its decision, the court found that the furnace in question re-
mained personalty. Had it determined the furnace to be a removable
fixture, the result would have been the same. A fact of great importance
in this case is that the parties stipulated that the prior mortgagee had no
notice of the conditional sales contract or the interest of the seller. Thus,
in keeping with the spirit of § 9-313(2), the court sustained the interest
of purchase money secured party, even though that interest took the form
of a "secret lien." 65
For these reasons, the statement that "Jt~he leading case of Teaff v.
Hewitt has been simultaneously incorporated into the code and overruled
by it,"66 is not a definitive statement of Ohio law on the subject. In
applying the "universal" test of Teaff v. Hewitt, Ohio courts have distin-
guished cases involving priorities between a lender or a seller of a chattel
and a holder of a real estate interest from other kinds of cases, e.g., taxa-
tion, landlord/tenant, etc. In determining prioxities between chattel and
real estate interest holders, the courts have further distinguished subse-
quent real estate interests from those which arose prior to the improvement
encumlbrancer purchasing at his own foreclosure sale is a subsequent purchaser within this
section." (emphasis added) U.C.C. § 9-313(4) (1962 Official Text). This language has been
deleted from the 1972 version.
62lEast Ohio Bldg. & Loan Co. v. Holland Furnace Co., 48 Ohio App. 545, 194 N. E. 598
(1934). The near identity of facts in this case and those in Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull
Say. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273 (1939), is instructive. Both cases involved
home furnaces which were not affixed (other than by their own weight) to the owner's dwell-
ing. In reaching conclusions concerning affixation, appropriation to the use of the realty, and
intention, the courts reached different conclusions because the one case involved a subsequent
purchaser and the other a prior mortgagee. See also Holland Furnace Co. v. Joy, 16 Ohio
L. Abs. 251 (C.P. Columbiana Co. 1934).
68 48 Ohio App. 545, 194 N.E. 598 (1934).
64 Id. at 550-51, 194 N.E. at 600.
OrThere is even some Ohio authority for protection of a nonpurchase money lender's
interest against a prior mortgagee, see Hine v. Morris, 7 Ohio Dec. Rep. 482 (Mahoning Dist.
Ct. 1878).
66 Hollander, supra note 12, at 686.
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of the realty. The results in the Ohio cases in both types of situations
have been basically consistent with the priority philosophy of § 9-313.
III. THE 1972 AMENDMENTS TO THE
U.C.C. FIXTURE PROVISION
The appearance of the 1972 uniform version of § 9-313 provides an
opportunity for legislative reappraisal of statutory priorities relating to col-
lateral in the form of fixtures. A number of criticisms leveled against
the earlier version of § 9-313 have been met by the new position. The
major changes are the following:
(1) Explicit recognition is made of the special position of the pur-
chase money secured creditor in subsection 4(a) of the new draft. Such a
creditor may obtain priority over an existing real estate interest holder
of record if the creditor perfects by making a fixture filing within 10 days
after the goods become fixtures.67 The effect of this provision is virtually
to eliminate the "secret lien" aspect of the secured creditor's interest and
thus to overcome to a very substantial extent one of the major criticisms
of the earlier uniform text.
(2) In virtually all other cases (non-purchase money security inter-
ests), the secured creditor will not prevail against the holder of the real
estate interest unless the former perfects his interest by making a fixture
filing before the interest of the other party is of record." ' Even if the
secured party perfects properly, he will not prevail unless "the debtor has
an interest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real es-
tate.""9 The effect of this requirement is to further eliminate the possibil-
ity of lack of notice to competing real estate interest holders. A "fixture
filing" must be made "in the office where a mortgage on the real estate
would be filed or recorded" and must conform to "the requirements of
subsection (5) of Section 9-402. ' '7 Revised § 9-402 (5) requires that
the fixture filing describe the real estate and that the name of the record
owner be shown on the financing statement if the debtor does not hold
an interest of record in the realty. This provision, taken together with
the indexing requirements of the amended version of § 9-403 (7), insures
that the interest of the Article 9 creditor will be known to any reasonable
searcher of the real estate records.
(3) Two circumstances exist under the new statute in which the se-
8TThis means that a financing statement must be filed. U.C.C. § 9-302(1)(d) (1972
Official Text) specifically requires filing in the case of a purchaser money security interest
in consumer goods when they are fixtures. The 10-day filing requirement in U.C.C. § 9-
313(4)(a) (1972 Official Text) incorporates the general code approach to purchase money
security interests reflected in U.C.C. § 9-312(4) (1972 Official Text) and applies it to such
interests when the collateral is a fixture.
68U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(b) (1972 Official Text).
69 Id.
7oJ-.C.C. § 9-313(I) (b), (1972 Official Text).
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cured party may prevail over a real estate interest holder in spite of the
absence of a fixture filing. The first of these occurs when "the fixtures
are readily removable factory or office machines or readily removable re-
placements of domestic appliances which are consumer goods. ' 71 The fix-
ture lender will prevail if he has perfected his interest "by any method
permitted by this Article" '72 before the goods become fixtures. The purpose
of this section is to reduce the difficulty of the fixture lender in a class
of cases in which the status of the chattel as a fixture is somewhat tenuous.
For this reason it has been suggested that it is not unfair to require a
real estate buyer or mortgagee to make a check of chattel records. 3 The
section becomes operative, of course, only if the chattels affected may be
classified as fixtures under local law.
The provision raises a number of definitional problems: (1) What is
meant by "readily removable"? (2) What is a factory or office machine?
(3) What is the scope of the term "domestic .appliance"? One author
has pointed out that fixture filing or dual fixture and chattel filing may
be the only safe course for a lender/seller until these questions are clarified
by litigation.74 It is interesting to note that the drafters of revised § 9-
313 originally attempted to define "fixture" for purposes of the section,
and that the definition stated "readily removable factory and office ma-
chines and readily removable replacements of domestic appliances are not
fixtures. ' 75 Having abandoned the effort to accomplish a uniform defini-
tion of the term "fixture," the drafters have none the less chosen to treat
an ambigously and somewhat arbitrarily7 6 defined class of goods in a dif-
ferent manner for purposes of Article 9. The conflicting interests of the
secured lender and a real estate mortgagee or purchaser ought to be re-
solved in connection with the determination of the status of the chattel
involved, i.e., is it a fixture? If the chattel may be classified as a fixture,
the real estate interest holder ought to be given the benefit of a fixture
filing.
Subsection 4(d) of revised § 9-313 permits the secured creditor who
71 U.C.C. § 9-313(4)(c) (1972 Official Text).
721d.
73 For purposes of this section, perfection "by any method permitted by this article" will
generally be a chattel filing; in the case of consumer goods, automatic perfection without
filing is possible under § 9-302(1)(d) if the security interest is of the purchase money variety.
Comment 4(d) of the 1972 version of § 9-313 makes it clear that the drafters intend that
no filing whatsoever is required in connection with a purchase money security interest in
replacement of consumer goods.
74 Coogan, The New UCC Article 9, 86 HARv. L. REV. 477, 496-97 (1973) [hereinafter
cited as Coogan].
7 5 PERMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW COM-
MITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PREIMINARY DRAFT No.
1. SUBPARAGRAPH 9-313(1)(b)(i) (Nov. 20, 1968), 5 U.C.C REP. SERV. 1135 (1969).
76 Coogan noted the inconsistency in treating a farmer's milk cooling equipment differently
from a factory or office machine. Coogan, supra note 74, at 497.
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has perfected by any method permitted by Article 9 to prevail over a
real estate lien acquired after perfection. This provision is not relevant
to the problem of a real estate mortgagee or purchaser, but relates only
to the general creditor who attempts to satisfy his judgment against the
debtor's property or to the hypothetical lien creditor who figures promi-
nently in bankruptcy proceedings. The decision to dispense with the need
for a fixture filing in these kinds of cases is an appropriate one.
(4) The status of the construction mortgagee is dealt with explicitly
in subsection 6 of the new statute.77  If the construction mortgage is re-
corded before the goods become fixtures, and if the goods become fixtures
before the completion of the construction process, the mortgagee will pre-
vail over a purchase money secured party who would otherwise prevail
under subsection 4(a) of § 9-313. Although subsection 6 subjects the
construction mortgagee to the remaining provisions of subsections 4 and
5, the mortgagee is likely to have recorded before any filing of a fixture
interest and will thus prevail over any fixture lender.
The 1972 text of § 9-313 continues to leave the question of what
is a fixture to local law, but specifies that "ordinary building materials
incorporated into an improvement on land" 78 may not be the subject of
a security interest. Like the earlier text, the new provision recognizes that
the real estate mortgagee may encumber fixtures. No perfection of any
kind is required f the secured party has obtained consent or a disclaimer
from the real estate interest holder or if the debtor has the right to remove
the goods as against the encumbrancer or owner.79  The new act states
that the fixture lender will be subordinate to any conflicting owner or
encumbrancer unless the lender has obtained a priority under one of the
specific provisions of the statute. Finally, the secured party's right to re-
moval is unchanged in the new text.
It is this author's opinion that the basic priority scheme of the 1972
text of § 9-313 satisfies the legitimate interests of the fixture lender and
the real estate mortgagee or purchaser and ought to be adopted by the
Ohio legislature with certain modifications which will not affect the prior-
ity policy or interfere unduly with the goal of uniformity sought by the
sponsors of the uniform act. The most serious criticisms of the earlier
version of § 9-313, those relating to secrecy, have been met by the new
provision. The only situation in which a prior recordation of a real estate
interest will not suffice to overcome the interest of the fixture lender is
77 "Construction mortgage" is defined as follows in the revised text: "[A) mortgage is
a 'construction mortgage' to the extent that it secures an obligation incurred for the construc-
tion of an improvement on land including the acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded
writing so indicates." U.C.C. § 9-313(1)(c) (1972 Official Text).
78 U.C.C. § 9-313(2) (1972 Official Text).
79This last provision is intended to fix the "status of fixtures installed by tenants (as
well as such persons as licensees and holders of easement)." U.C.C. § 9-313, Comment 6
(1972 Official Text).
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the case of the purchase money security interest. Even in that case, the
interest of the secured party must arise before the goods become fixtures,
a fixture filing within 10 days after the goods become fixtures is required,
and the debtor must either have an interest of record in the real estate
or be in possession thereof. The limited priority of the purchase money
secured party goes no further than necessary to insure a source of credit
(other than the mortgagee) for needed and valuable improvements to real
estate. The most serious possibility of double financing and the resulting
interference with legitimate mortgagee interests have been obviated by the
priority accorded to a construction mortgage.
The difficulty which remains in the 1972 version of the statute is not
related to the basic priority policy which. it articulates. What is required
in Ohio, and what has always been required, is a definition of fixture for
purposes of the statute. Adoption of a definition will permit removal
of subsection (4) (c) of the act which introduces needless ambiguity and
possible unfairness into the priority scheme. The substitution of a defini-
tion of fixture for subsection (1) (a) of the act, a definition of "ordinary
building materials," and removal of subsection (4) (c) will result in the
clearest possible legislative statement on this difficult subject. Legislative
rather than judicial definition of fixture for the .purpose of § 9-313 is
not inconsistent with the intent of the sponsors of the uniform act."0 Such
a definition will have the effect of clarifying the scope of § 9-313 in Ohio,
but it will not contradict the results which Ohio courts have actually
reached in cases involving priority disputes. In addition, in order to insure
that the holder of the real estate interest will know in advance of any
removal of collateral by a superior secured party, the present Ohio provi-
sion requiring noti~fication of intention to remove to any person entitled
to reimbursement may be appended to subsection 8 of the amended statute
without undue violence to the concept of uniformity.
IV. A PROPOSED DEFINITION OF FIXTURES FOR ARTICLE 9
In determining the scope of the fixture concept, it is important that
the legislature limit itself to the problem which is addressed by § 9-313.
That section is not concerned about the rights of a tenant vis-4-vis his land-
lord or classification of property for tax purposes. Thus it is not necessary
for the legislature to consider the scope of the term as it applies to these
situations. What is needed is a definition of fixture which will provide
SOThe application of § 9-313 in a minority jurisdiction which rejects the concept of
a removable fixture will result in chaos, even though the minority position is a matter of
semantics rather than substance. Absent a uniform fixture definition or some "completely
different approach" to the mechanisms which establish § 9-313 priorities, Professor Gilmore
has stated that "the only solution (at least for the minority rule states) will be the inclusion of a
fixture definition-whose drafting will no doubt prove to be as difficult as the original drafts-
men had anticipated." Gilmore, The Purchase Money Priority, 76 -ARv. L. REv. 1333, 1396
(1963).
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a framework for the operation of priority provisions which assume on the
one hand a seller or lender who wishes to obtain a security interest in
a fixture and a mortgagee or subsequent purchaser of the realty on the
other hand.
An examination of several attempts to establish a uniform definition of
the term for inclusion in § 9-313 provides a useful starting point for the
legislature, in spite of the fact that no definition found its way into the
1972 version of the uniform act. The fact that it may be difficult or im-
possible to get fifty legislatures to agree upon a common definition does
not detract from the usefulness of a statutory definition by one legislature.
The Review Committee for Article 9, in its first preliminary draft, proposed
the following definition:
Section 9-313. Priority of Security Interests in Fixtures.
(1) (a) This section governs the priority between a security interest
in goods, including fixtures, and a real estate interest in the goods. The
declaration in this section that certain goods are not fixtures is only for the
purpose of the priority rules stated in this section, and does not determine
whether an interest in the goods passes under a conveyance or mortgage
of the real estate or whether the goods are part of real estate under the law
of this state other than this Act.
(b) For the purpose of this Section and the provisions in Part 4 of
this Article referring to fixture filing, the following definitions apply:
(i) Goods are "fixtures" when they are so related to particular real
estate that under the law of this state other than this Act an interest in the
goods would pass as part of the real estate under a conveyance or mortgage
thereof without specific mention of the goods, except as stated in this para-
graph. Where ordinary building materials are incorporated in an im-
provement upon land, which improvement is itself not a fixture, the ma-
terials are real estate and not a fixture. An improvement upon land is not
a fixture unless it is readily removable from the land. Readily removable
factory and office machines and readily removable replacements of domes-
tic appliances are not fixtures. Where the debtor is a tenant, goods which
he has a right to remove are not fixtures but are personal property. Stand-
ing timber and growing crops and oil, gas and minerals before severance
are not fixtures.
(ii) The term 'ordinary building materials' include lumber, millwork,
brick, tile, siding, roofing, cement, glass, wiring, piping and structural
members, other than readily removable items of special value such as orna-
mental metal work, ornamental mantels and carved panelling.8 '
The principal element of the Revision Committee's definition is con-
tained in the first sentence of subsection (1) (b) (i) which provides that
goods will be fixtures for the purpose of code priorities whenever they
would be regarded as fixtures under other state law in connection with a
81 PMANENT EDITORIAL BOARD FOR THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, REVIEW COM-
MITTEE FOR ARTICLE 9 OF THE UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE, PRELIMINARY DRAFT No.
1, SUBPARAGEAPHS 9-313(1)(b)(i), (ii) (Nov. 20, 1968), 5 U.C.C. REP. SERv. 1135(1969).
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conveyance or mortgage. No further guidance is provided apart from
specific exceptions which are carved out and declared not to be fixtures.
Peter F. Coogan, a consultant to the Article 9 Review Committee,
offered a definition for inclusion in § 9-313 in an article written in 1965:
9-313. Security Interests in Fixtures.
(1) The following rules govern the application of this Article to
goods associated with particular real estate.
(a) Neither the fixture rules nor any other rules of this Article
shall apply to goods after they have become building materials, and no
security interest in them can thereafter exist under this Article. Fixture
rules include those of this section 9-313 and the fixture filing rules of Part
4 of this Article.
The term building materials includes goods that have become so in-
corporated or built into a building that their removal therefrom would
necessarily involve the removal or destruction of some part of the building
and thereby cause substantial damage to the building apart from the value
of the goods removed, but the term does not include goods that are sev-
erable from the land merely by unscrewing, unbolting, unclamping or
uncoupling, or some other method of disconnection, and does not include
equipment or consumer goods installed in a building for use in the carry-
ing on of an industry or activity where the only substantial damage, apart
from the value of the equipment or consumer goods removed, that would
necessarily be caused to the building in removing the equipment or con-
sumer goods therefrom is that arising from the removal or destruction of
the bed or casting on or in which the item is set and the making or en-
largement of an opening in the walls of the building sufficient for the
removal from the building. Building includes a structure, erection, or
mine, erected or constructed on or in land.
This Act does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon fixtures
or real estate pursuant to the law applicable to real estate, but the pri-
orities established by this section shall control where applicable.
(b) The fixture rules do not apply to any collateral other than equip-
ment or consumer goods, nor to equipment or consumer goods not phys-
ically affixed to the realty, nor to such goods physically attached only
by electrical cords or temporary water connections, nor do they apply to
equipment physically attached only for a purpose such as reducing noise or
vibration, or holding the equipment in place. Security interests in such
collateral are covered by sections of Article 9 other than the fixture rules.
(c) The fixture provisions of this Article apply to equipment and
consumer goods which relate to the functioning of the building, for what-
ever purpose it may be used (as distinguished from the functioning of
particular activities conducted therein), including goods used for plumb-
ing, heating, air conditioning, refrigeration, sprinkling systems and other
equipment and consumer goods which are customarily physically affixed to
the real estate, not including building materials referred to in subdivision
(a) nor goods attached only for the purposes set forth in subdivision (b).
Notwithstanding the provisions of paragraphs (a) and (b), such fixture
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rules apply to portable buildings other than those required to be registered
or licensed in connection with motor vehicle laws.82
This definition reflects the tripartite division of property into (1) realty
(incorporated building materials); (2) personalty (farm products, inven-
tory, non-affixed or slightly affixed equipment or consumer goods, consum-
er goods or equipment affixed solely for the purpose of reducing noise,
vibration, or for holding equipment in place); and (3) fixtures (physically
affixed equipment and consumer goods related to the functioning of the
building as opposed to the functioning of whatever activity is conducted
therein, 2 and certain portable buildings).'
In addition to these proposals for uniform definitions, two state legis-
latures have included statutory definitions in their versions of § 9-313.5
The purpose of a fixture definition in § 9-313 is to alert a secured
creditor to those situations in which he is faced with the possibility of
a competing real estate interest in the same collateral. A warning that
the chattel which the creditor is accepting as collateral will or may become
a fixture subject to such a conflicting interest will permit him to make
a fixture filing and thereby protect his interest to the extent permitted
by § 9-313. Thus the code definition must be coextensive with the fix-
ture concept which affects real estate mortgagees and purchasers of realty.
The Revision Committee recognized this need when it framed a definition
in terms of noncode state law determining when "an interest in the goods
would pass as part of the real estate under a conveyance or mortgage
thereof without specific mention of the goods." The weakness of the Re-
view Committee's proprosal is that it provides little guidance to the solu-
82 Coogan, Fixtures-Uniformity in Words or Fact?, 113 U. PA. L. REV. 1186, 1226-27
(1965).
83 This distinction is not unlike that made in Ohio many years ago in connection with
"motive power" machinery as opposed to that propelled by motive power machinery. Case
Mfg. Co. v. Garven, 45 Ohio St. 289, 13 N. E. 493 (1887).
84 Another proposal, combining features of both the Review Committee and the Coogan
definitions, is contained in a Note, Toward a Satisfactory Fixture Definition for the Uniform
Commercial Code, 55 CORNELL L REv. 477 (1970). That proposed definition adopts the
tripartite approach of Coogan, with some simplification of the ordinary building materials por-
tion, but includes the statement of the Review Committee limiting the operation of the defini-
tion to § 9-313 questions.
8 5 A fixture as used in this act is hereby defined to mean, 'that which is affixed to realty
or at last so mechanically fitted so as to become a part thereof and not to be separable
without material injury to the freehold, or which is necessary to the continued exis-
tence or operation of the enterprise or institution as it is carred on upon the premises.
IDAHo CODE § 28-9-313(1) (1967).
Following the first sentence of § 9-313(1) dealing with structural materials, the Kansas
statute contains the following statement:
Other goods become fixtures under this act when affixing them to real estate so asso-
ciates them with the real estate that, in the absence of any agreement or understanding
with his vendor as to the goods, a purchaser of real estate with knowledge of interests
of others of record, or in possession, would reasonably consider the goods to have
been purchased as part of the real estate.
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84,9-313(1) (1972 Supp.).
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tion of a specific problem, and it has been contrasted unfavorably in this
respect with Mr. Coogan's suggested definition.86
It is true that the Coogan proposal offers more guidance to a business-
man, lawyer, or court as a result of its greater detail. It is a laudable
attempt to insert a degree of specificity and certainty into a complex and
confused area of law. The definition, however, presents two important
difficulties. The first, inherent in any attempt at detailed definition, is that
the definition may be outstripped by technological developments relating
to new kinds of goods and methods of installation.' The second is that
such a definition creates the possibility of lack of co-extensiveness between
the code definition and common law determinations of what is a fixture
for the purpose of a mortgagee's security or a realty purchaser's rights
vis-i-vis a mortgagor or seller. For example, in requiring that goods be
physically attached to realty before they can become fixtures, the definition
ignores a number of decisions which have dispensed with the requirement
of actual physical affixation and which have recognized the concept of
constructive annexation.tu The Ohio supreme court has indicated that
the test of physical annexation is the least important of the criteria an-
nounced by the court in Teaff v. Hewitt," and a court of appeals has rec-
ognized the doctrine of constructive annexation ° Mr. Coogan's require-
ment that attachment be accomplished by something more than an electri-
cal cord or temporary water connection presents an even greater potential
conflict with the trend of common law decisions which tend to construe the
interests of mortgagees and purchasers broadly. 1
The effect of a code definition which is less inclusive than common
law fixture concepts as they apply to mortgagees and purchasers will be
an inevitable source of difficulty. For example, assume a chattel within
the scope of subsection (1) (b) of Mr. Coogan's proposal which might
none the less be regarded fairly as being within the scope of a mortgagee's
security, i.e., a fixture, on the basis of the trend of judicial decisions in
this area. The seller of the chattel, wishing to reserve a purchase money
86 Note, Toward a Satisfactory Fixture Definition for the Uniform Commercial Code, 55
CORNB LLL. REv. 477, 483-84 (1970).
87 2 G. GLMoRE, SEctJarry INTERESTs iN PERSONAL PROPERTY § 30.5, at 819 (1965).
88 R. BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 138 at 706-08 (2d ed. 1955). In Leisle v. Welfare
Building & Loan Ass'n., 232 Wis. 440, 287 N.W. 739 (1939), the Supreme Court of Wisconsin
held rollaway beds, unattached in any way to the apartment building in which they were
located, to be fixtures within the scope of the mortgagee's security.
89 Holland Furnace Co. v. Trumbull Sav. & Loan Co., 135 Ohio St. 48, 19 N.E.2d 273
(1939).
90 XXth Century Heating & Ventilating Co. v. Home Owners' Loan Corp., 56 Ohio App.
188, 10 N.E.2d 229 (1937).
91 The mortgagor, being the owner of the property, will presumably have intended
all of his additions which are actually or constructively attached to the land and which
are adapted to the use of the land to become a permanent part thereof.
5 AMmEcAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.7 at 29 (1952).
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security interest, determines that no fixture filing is required by § 9-313
and perfects by another method permitted by Article 9. When the con-
flict between the seller and mortgagee arises, the seller argues that he
has done all that the code requires; the mortgagee responds that he has
been deprived of fair notice since the real estate records were silent about
the seller's interest in property covered by the mortgage.9" If the resolu-
tion of this conflict results in recognition of the mortgagee's superiority,
the § 9-313 definition has misled the chattel seller. On the other hand,
a resolution favoring the seller under these circumstances permits the nar-
row code definition to operate to defeat the reasonable expectations of
the mortgagee. An answer may be suggested that a reasonable mortgagee
should read § 9-313 and should realize that conflicting decisional law has
been overruled thereby in so far as it affects priority disputes. However,
the effect of the fixture definition in § 9-315 is to deprive the mortgagee of
the benefit of a fixture filing as to goods which are fixtures for the purpose
of their passing under a mortgage, but personalty for the purpose of es-
tablishing the priority of the purchase money seller. Even more alarming
to a mortgagee is the possibility that the definition may be applied by
a court to cases involving only the interests of mortgagor and mortgagee,
an effect obviously unintended by anyone.
These considerations have led the author to propose a definition of
fixture for inclusion in the 1972 Ohio version of § 9-313 which provides
somewhat more guidance than is offered by the Revision Committee, but
which avoids the problems created by an attempt at detailed definition.
The proposed definition relates to the very tests utilized by courts in de-
termining the scope of a mortgagee's security or a purchaser's rights in
relation to a mortgagor or seller of realty. 3 The effect of such an ap-
proach is to provide less in the way of concrete criteria, but to permit
a mortgagee or purchaser of realty to receive the full benefit of the new
filing requirements in all cases in which he may reasonably expect them
to be relevant. A definition stated in terms of general criteria will require
judicial interpretation and application; this is certainly equally true of the
Revision Committee's proposal as well as certain aspects of the Coogan
proposal. In order to know whether or not a particular transaction falls
within the scope of § 9-313, it will be necessary for a seller or lender
to make inquiries concerning the use to be made of the chattel which
9 2 Professor Kripke is correct when he states that the result of a code definition narrower
than a state's conception of what would pass under a real estate conveyance would be a
problem without a rule of decision under the code. Kripke, supra note 6, at 63-64. The
priorities between the seller of goods and the mortgagee would not fall within the scope
of § 9-313 since the goods would not be fixtures within the definition of that section; at
the same time the interest of the real estate mortgagee is not a security interest within the
scope of § 9-312.
93 The text of revised § 9-313, including the author's proposed amendments, is contained
in the appendix to this article, infra.
1973]
OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL
is to serve as collateral. Such a burden of inquiry is already placed upon
sellers and lenders in connection with classification of collatera 94 and is
not unreasonable.
The proposed definition begins with the Review Committee's concept
that goods are fixtures for the purpose of § 9-313 when they would pass
as part of the real estate under a conveyance or mortgage of the real
estate without specific mention of the goods. It proceeds to state the cri-
teria which determine when such an interest will pass. This approach
may be criticized as being an unwarranted intrusion "into substantive rules
of the law of real estate conveyancing." 5 However, the author has at-
tempted to limit the scope of any intrusion by the language of subsection
(3) of his proposal. The proposed fixture definition is clearly not germane
to taxation, landlord/tenant, and eminent domain questions, for example.
The definition does affect substantive real estate law concepts as they relate
to the rights of a mortgagee against mortgagor as well as those of a
purchaser of real estate against a seller. This is preferable, however, to
a code definition which is narrower than the substantive real estate concept
and is justified by the additional guidance which the definition provides
to interested parties in an area in which code and real estate concepts
are inextricably intertwined.
The general criteria utilized in this definition reflect those which are
applied consistently by courts in determining the scope of a mortgagee's
security or a purchaser's rights in relation to a mortgagor or seller. The
test of whether or not a chattel becomes a fixture for these purposes is
determined by the objective intent of a reasonable annexor, "to be ascer-
tained in the light of the nature of the article, the degree of annexation,
and the appropriateness of the article to the use to which the realty is
put."" The emphasis upon the various factors indicating objective intent
will vary from case to case.
Sometimes the permanency of annexation is the determining factor in con-
struing the intent of the annexor; in others the controlling factor is the
importance of the chattel to the operating unit, or the damage which
would result to the land or the chattel on removal.97
The author's proposed definition recognizes that in some cases degree and
manner of affixation may be controlling while in others adaptation to use
may overcome the complete absence of physical affixation. It eliminates
the need for the specific reference to readily removable collateral contained
94U.C.C. § 9-109 (1962 Official Text). For a discussion of this problem, see WITE
& SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 23-13 (1972).
95 Profsesor Kripke has so charasterized efforts at solutions which lie between the generality
of the Review Committee definition on the one hand and the specificity of the Coogan proposal
on the other. Kripke, supra note 6, at 64.
9 6 BROWN, PERSONAL PROPERTY § 141, at 726 (2d ed. 1955).
97 5 AMERICAN LAW OF PROPERTY § 19.7,, at 29 (1952).
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in the 1972 version of § 9-313(4) (c). By insuring that holders of real
estate interests will be given the benefit of the new and expanded filing
requirements of the 1972 uniform act in all cases in which such parties
have a judicially recognized interest in the collateral, the proposed version
of the statute will meet all legitimate needs of real estate lenders and
purchasers while permitting valuable and necessary improvements to be
financed by secured creditors who are disadvantaged by the present Ohio
statute.
APPENDix
PROPOSAL FOR A REVISED OHIO RULE TO DETERMINE
PRIORITIES IN FIXTURE COLLATERAL
9-313. PRIORITY OF SECURITY INTERESTS IN FIXTURES
(1) In this section and in the provisions of Part 4 of this Article referring
to fixture filing, unless the context otherwise requires
(a) goods other than ordinary building materials as defined by Subsec-
tion 2 of this section are "fixtures" when they are so related to particular
real estate that an interest in the goods will pass as part of the real estate
under a conveyance or mortgage thereof without specific mention of the
goods. Such an interest will 'pass
(i) when the goods are physically attached to realty in such a way that
their removal will result in substantial injury to the goods or to the real
estate (apart from diminution in value of the real estate caused by the ab-
sence of the goods or any need to replace them); or
(ii) when the goods, whether or not they arc physically attached to
the realty, are so necessary to the functioning, use, or enjoyment of the
realty itself (as distinguished from a particular business or activity con-
ducted thereon) that they may be regarded reasonably as having been in-
tended by the afflxor or owner to be permanent additions to the realty.(b) a "fixture filing" is the filing in the office where a mortgage on
the real estate would be filed or recorded of a financing statement covering
goods which are or are to become fixtures and conforming to the require-
ments of subsection (5) of Section 9-402.
(c) a mortgage is a "construction mortgage" to the extent that it se-
cures an obligation incurred for the construction of an improvement on
land including the acquisition cost of the land, if the recorded writing so
indicates.
(2) A security interest under this Article may be created in goods which
are fixtures or may continue in goods which become fixtures, but no secu-
rity interest exists under this Article in ordinary building materials incor-
porated into an improvement on land.
(a) The term "ordinary building materials" refers to goods on the
order of lumber, millwork, brick, tile, siding, roofing, cement, glass, wir-
ing, piping, and structural members.
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(b) The term "incorporated" means built into an improvement on
land in such a way that the removal of the building materials would neces-
sarily involve the destruction or removal of some part of the improvement
itself. It does not include goods which are severable merely by unscrew-
ing, unbolting, unclamping, uncoupling, or a similar method of discon-
nection.
(3) This section determines when goods are fixtures for the purpose of
passing under a conveyance or mortgage of real estate without specific
mention of the goods and for the purpose of the priority rules stated in
this section. This section does not determine whether goods are part of
real estate for any other purpose under the law of this state other than
this Act. This Article does not prevent creation of an encumbrance upon
fixtures pursuant to real estate law, but the priorities established by this
section shall control where applicable.
(4) A perfected security interest in fixtures has priority over the conflict-
ing interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate where
(a) the security interest is a purchase money security interest, the in-
terest of the encumbrancer or owner arises before the goods become fix-
tures, the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the goods
become fixtures or within ten days thereafter, and the debtor has an in-
terest of record in the real estate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(b) the security interest is perfected by a fixture filing before the in-
terest of the encumbrancer or owner is of record, the security interest has
priority over any conflicting interest of a predecessor in title of the encum-
brancer or owner, and the debtor has an interest of record in the real es-
tate or is in possession of the real estate; or
(c) the conflicting interest is a lien on the real estate obtained by
legal or equitable proceedings after the security interest was perfected by
any method permitted by this Article.
(5) A security interest in fixtures, whether or not perfected, has priority
over the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or owner of the real estate
where
(a) the encumbrancer or owner has consented in writing to the se-
curity interest or has disclaimed an interest in the goods as fixtures; or
(b) the debtor has a right to remove the goods as against the en-
cumbrancer or owner. If the debtor's right terminates, the priority of the
security interest continues for a reasonable time.
(6) Notwithstanding paragraph (a) of subsection (4) but otherwise sub-
ject to subsections (4) and (5), a security interest in fixtures is subordinate
to a construction mortgage recorded before the goods become fixtures if
the goods become fixtures before the completion of the construction. To
the extent that it is given to refinance a construction mortgage, a mortgage
has this priority to the same extent as the construction mortgage.
(7) In cases not within the preceding subsections, a security interest in
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fixtures is subordinate to the conflicting interest of an encumbrancer or
owner of the related real estate who is not the debtor.
(8) When the secured party has priority over all owners and encumbran-
cers of the real estate, he may, on default, subject to the provisions of
Part 5, remove his collateral from the real estate but he must reimburse
any encumbrancer or owner of the real estate who is not the debtor and
who has not otherwise agreed for the cost of repair of any physical injury,
but not for any diminution in value of the real estate caused by the
absence of the goods removed or by any necessity of replacing them. A
person entitled to reimbursement may refuse permission to remove until the
secured party gives adequate security for the performance of this obligaton.
The secured party shall give reasonable notification of his intention to




I. CONFLICT AND FEDERAL LABOR POLICY -------------------------- 752
A. An Introduction to the Problem Presented by
Wildcat Strikes ------------------------------------- 752
B. The Contours of the Term Wildcat ------------------------ 754
1. Definitional Problems ------------------------------- 754
2. An Initial Glance at Causes and Objectives --------------- 756
C. Wildcat Strikes and the Law:
The Need for Causative Investigation --------------------- 759
II. AN EVALUATION OF TRADITIONAL PERSPECTIVES ON
WILDCAT STRIKES ------------------------------------- 761
A. Employee Conflict and Institutional Interests ----------------- 761
B. The elllogic" of Collective Action ------------------------- 764
C. The Breakdown of Channels of Communication --------------- 767
D. The Incidence and Economic Effect of Wildcat Strikes --------- 770
E. A Brief Look at Legal Objections to Wildcat Strikes ---------- 772
III. WORK GROUP BEHAVIOR AND THE EFFECT OF TECHNOLOGY -------- 776
A. Cohesiveness and Technology ---------------------------- 776
B. The Sayles' Study ------------------------------------- 778
1. Relationship of the Work Done to Wildcat Activity -------- 778
a. Apathetic Groups ------------------------------- 778
b. Erratic Groups --------------------------------- 779
c. Strategic Groups ------------------------------- 780
d. Conservative Groups ---------------------------- 782
2. Intergroup Factors and Behavior Patterns ----------------- 783
a. The job Status Ladder --------------------------- 783
b. Size of the Work Group -------------------------- 785
c. Homogeneity of the Work Tasks ----------------- 786
d. Interdependence of the Work Process ---------------- 786
e. Work Standards Involving judgment ---------------- 787
3. Internal Organization of the Work Group
and Behavior Patterns ---------------------------- 787
C. Fractional Bargaining ---------------------------------- 790
IV. THE CAUSES AND FUNCTIONS OF WILDCAT STRIKES ---------------- 792
A. The Role of Disorder in Industrial Relations ----------------- 793
B. Conflicts Between Normative Structures --------------------- 795
C. Changes in the Industrial Social System and Employees'
Perception of Unfairness ------------------------------ 797
D. Economic and Psychological Perspectives of Wildcat Strikes ------ 799
E. Wildcat Strikes and the Grievance System -------------------- 802
F. The Contract as a Stablizing Influence ---------------------- 804
G. The Function of Conflict ------------------------------- 805
V. THE DETERRENT VALUE OF SANCTIONS ------------------------ 809
A. Wildcats and Union Responsibility ------------------------ 812
B. Penalties and Deterrents -------------------------------- 813
C. The Fortuitousness of Sanctions --------------------------- 814
CONCLUSION ---------------------------------------------------- 816
